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INTRODUCTION 
This is an Article about a pair of metaphors and the light that 
metaphors can shed on the process of judging in constitutional cases and 
the nature of constitutional change. The more familiar of these metaphors 
suggests that judges, including those in constitutional cases, act 
analogously to umpires.1 I have suggested in prior work that this is 
misguided and that a second metaphor is more apt. Judging in the 
American legal system often requires judges to engage in a mode of 
reasoning akin to that of their counterparts in “aesthetic” sports such as 
figure skating and gymnastics.2 The process involves not merely the 
simple application of rules (as the judge-as-umpire metaphor suggests), 
but rather often entails adherence to norms and the application of 
standards and principles that are often beyond the capacity of language to 
fully capture. Sometimes these norms, standards, and principles help the 
judge decide which of a host of applicable legal reasons to privilege. 
 
 * Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. Thanks to participants at 
“Amending America’s Unwritten Constitution,” sponsored by the Boston College Institute for 
Liberal Arts and the University of Texas School of Law, to participants in a faculty workshop at 
Marquette University Law School, and to Bruce Boyden, Emily Cauble, Atiba Ellis, Alex 
Lemann, Kali Murray, Ryan Scoville, and Mark Sides for their helpful feedback. 
 1. The most famous of these invocations was by Chief Justice Roberts at his confirmation 
hearing. See Transcript: Day One of the Roberts Hearings, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2005, 12:00 
AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091300693. 
html [https://perma.cc/C8YC-VU2T]. 
 2. See Chad M. Oldfather, Aesthetic Judging, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981, 981 (2018). 
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Other times they serve to provide more particularized content to those 
reasons. 
The notion of such intangible knowledge is not new, nor is the idea 
that judges must sometimes draw on it. The underlying concept has been 
reflected in philosopher Immanuel Kant’s aesthetic theory,3 scientist and 
philosopher Michael Polanyi’s “tacit knowledge,”4 United States 
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s declaration that 
“[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases,”5 and scholar Karl 
Llewellyn’s “situation sense”—the latter characterizing it as a 
combination of “ways and attitudes which are much more and better felt 
and done than they are said.”6 Just as figure-skating judges must apply 
indeterminate criteria such as “flow and effortless glide,”7 and must 
otherwise judge in a context in which the written rules of the sport do not 
(because they cannot) fully specify what judges are to privilege and how 
they are to go about assessing it, so must legal judges apply 
underspecified concepts such as “due process” and “equal protection” 
and unspecified concepts such as “separation of powers” and 
“federalism” while making choices about the applicability and weight of 
various interpretive modalities. This is not to suggest a pervasive lack of 
readily applicable criteria. There are easy questions in both contexts. But 
both types of judges also routinely draw on internalized senses of what 
sorts of criteria are appropriate to a situation and use those criteria to 
assess the relative appropriateness and strength of the various arguments 
and potential conclusions available.8 Justice Stewart’s (in)famous “I 
 
 3. See DOUGLAS E. EDLIN, COMMON LAW JUDGING: SUBJECTIVITY, IMPARTIALITY, AND THE 
MAKING OF LAW 52–54 (2016). 
 4. The core idea in the concept of tacit knowledge is “we . . . know more than we can tell.” 
MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 4 (1966) [hereinafter POLANYI, TACIT DIMENSION] 
(emphasis omitted). Polanyi contends “that strictly speaking nothing that we know can be said 
precisely,” and that some types of knowledge are so thoroughly beyond our capacity to describe 
that they may properly be labeled “ineffable.” MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: 
TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 87–88 (1962) [hereinafter POLANYI, PERSONAL 
KNOWLEDGE]. “[T]o the extent to which our intelligence falls short of the ideal of precise 
formulation, we act and see by the light of unspecifiable knowledge,” which sometimes, including 
in the case of the common law, can be embodied in tradition, in recognition of the principle “that 
practical wisdom is more truly embodied in action than expressed in rules of action.” Id. at 53–
54. 
 5. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 6. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 214 (1960). 
 7. U.S. FIGURE SKATING JUDGES EDUC. & TRAINING SUBCOMM., U.S. FIGURE SKATING 
SINGLE/PAIRS JUDGING MANUAL FOR TEST JUDGES’ TRANINING 25 (1979), https://www.usfsa.org/ 
content/00S-PSchool%20Manual2-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B9W-5HX3].  
 8. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems 
for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (“Judges and lawyers subscribe to an elaborate 
network of craft norms. Acquired through professional training and experience, these norms 
generate a high degree of convergence . . . on what counts as appropriate decisionmaking.”). 
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know it when I see it”9 formulation may be unfashionable, and indeed it 
may not satisfy all the norms associated with the judicial role, but it 
captures a core truth about judging. 
This Article extends the project of exploring the metaphor to the 
specific context of constitutional adjudication and change. It works from 
the understanding that both sports and constitutional law can be 
understood as “practices” in the philosophical sense, as “activities that 
are constituted by the convergent or overlapping understandings, 
expectations, and intentions of multiple participants.”10 The analysis is 
thus fundamentally comparative in nature. Conceiving of the operation 
of constitutional law in these terms, like any comparative analysis, helps 
to uncover and highlight certain of its features, including the ways in 
which its content is susceptible to change, only some of which occur in 
the formalistic ways easily accounted for by the umpire model. The 
approach is useful not only in providing a counter to the notion of the 
judge-as-umpire, but also in that it helps flesh out, supplement, and make 
more concrete a model of constitutional law that includes judicially 
implemented change.  
The metaphor also operates as a caution. Figure-skating judges, after 
all, do not enjoy a sterling reputation for impartiality or incorruptibility.11 
Recognition that judges in the legal system perform an analogous role—
and one that is likewise heavily dependent on the good-faith application 
of an internalized cluster of norms and values—thus serves to highlight 
the need for attention to institutional legitimacy and invites consideration 
of ways in which that legitimacy might be preserved (or eroded). If the 
 
 9. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 10. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 88 (2018). 
Fallon elaborates as follows: 
American constitutional law is a practice in this sense, constituted by the 
shared understandings, expectations, and intentions of those who accept the 
constitutional order and participate in constitutional argument and adjudicative 
practices. It is crucial to recognize, moreover, that the relevant understandings 
and expectations go far beyond knowledge of the linguistic meanings of the 
Constitution’s words and the history of its drafting and ratification. 
Id.; see also Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1957 (2008) 
(“[T]he recognition and non-recognition of law and legal sources is better understood as a practice 
in the Wittgensteinian sense: a practice in which lawyers, judges, commentators, and other legal 
actors gradually and in diffuse fashion determine what will count as a legitimate source—and thus 
what will count as law.”). 
 11. The highest profile scandal took place at the 2002 Winter Olympics and resulted in a 
substantial reworking of the judging system, which has continued to undergo adjustments in the 
wake of subsequent controversies. Gabrielle Tetrault-Farber, Despite Reforms, Figure Skating 
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comparison reveals that some of the two worlds’ shared features play a 
significant part in the story of why figure-skating judging is regarded with 
suspicion, then we ought to carefully examine those features’ role in the 
legal system as well. This lesson is especially pertinent in the current 
environment of deep partisan division. 
I.  AESTHETIC JUDGING IN SPORT AND LAW 
A.  A Brief Overview of Judging in Aesthetic Sports 
Philosophers of sport have distinguished between sports in which the 
role of officials is primarily to ensure compliance with the rules, with 
scoring determined in a manner that is otherwise independent of the 
officials’ judgment, and those in which a primary responsibility of the 
officials is to assess the competitors’ performances and thereby to serve 
as the source of the scores based on which winners and losers are 
determined.12 The former, known under one formulation as “purposive” 
sports,13 includes football, basketball, hockey, and baseball. In such 
sports scoring depends on the achievement of specified goals—getting 
the ball across the goal line or through the hoop, for example—with no 
consideration for how the goal is achieved so long as it is not done in a 
prohibited manner.14 The latter, sometimes called “aesthetic” sports,15 
most prominently includes figure skating and gymnastics, but also 
includes some equestrian sports as well as more recent additions to the 
sports landscape such as snowboarding. These sports place considerably 
less emphasis on the achievement of a specified goal and more on the 
manner in which the goal is achieved.16 It is impossible to “win ugly” in 
an aesthetic sport, for the simple reason that skilled, and often beautiful, 
performance is the central criterion in determining who wins. And while 
teams and athletes in purposive sports routinely overcome officials’ 
blown calls, the nature of aesthetic sports and the role of judges within 
them make it nearly impossible to win in the face of error by an official 
for the simple reason that it is, fundamentally, the officials who determine 
who wins and who loses.  
These differences have implications for the nature of officials’ roles. 
An official in a purposive sport determines whether some antecedent state 
of affairs complied with what is often (though not always17) a bright-line 
 
 12. See, e.g., DAVID BEST, PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN MOVEMENT 103–05 (1978). 
 13. Id. at 103–04. 
 14. Id. at 104. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. As Mark Graber has pointed out, the role of an official in such sports often involves 
considerably less mechanistic application of rules than meets the eye and considerably more 
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rule, sometimes literally, in the sense that the job often entails assessing 
where a ball or a player was relative to some painted line. These sorts of 
assessments can be, and increasingly are, reviewed for correctness by 
instant replay. In contrast, the judge assessing a performance in an 
aesthetic sport draws upon his or her expertise to give significance to an 
antecedent state of affairs in a much more holistic sense. Such 
assessments involve the balancing of sometimes incommensurable 
considerations and are too observer-dependent for replay review to serve 
as anything more than a replacement for, rather than correction of, the 
initial determinations. As author Nicholas Dixon puts it, “Even if we can 
agree on common criteria for aesthetic judgments, two different works of 
art— or athletic performances—can qualify as aesthetically pleasing by 
virtue of different subsets of these criteria, making it difficult to make 
comparative judgments.”18 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the rules in aesthetic sports typically provide 
little in the way of specific criteria for judges to draw upon in assessing 
performances.19 The factors that make up excellence in a given sport are 
too diverse and too disjunctive—and the balancing and weighing of them 
too complex—to be reduced to a formula.20 Put differently, any attempt 
to articulate criteria would be incomplete, and a formula would 
necessarily leave some components of excellence excluded or 
undervalued—and others elevated—with inevitable and potentially 
undesirable consequences for the nature of the sport itself. Judges possess 
what Polanyi terms “subsidiary knowledge”; they “can indicate their 
clues and formulate their maxims, they know many more things than they 
can tell, knowing them only in practice, as instrumental particulars, and 
not explicitly, as objects.”21 These sports thus rely on judges’ 
internalization of what constitutes excellence within the sport. The judge 
has in mind an ideal performance, or a set of ideals corresponding to each 
component of a performance, and she scores each actual performance 
based on her assessment of where it stands in relation to the ideal.22 One 
 
acting in ways that require drawing on an understanding of the context in which a decision takes 
place. Mark A. Graber, Law and Sports Officiating: A Misunderstood and Justly Neglected 
Relationship, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 293, 302 (1999). “Most games, from little league baseball to 
professional basketball, would neither be as fun nor as recreational if sports officials understood 
their responsibilities as enforcing rules rather than as preventing teams from gaining unfair 
advantages in ways not intended by the laws of the game.” Id. 
 18. Nicholas Dixon, Canadian Figure Skaters, French Judges, and Realism in Sport, 30 J. 
PHIL. SPORT 103, 104–05 (2003). 
 19. See Oldfather, supra note 2, at 1024–25. 
 20. See id. at 1025–26. 
 21. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 4, at 88. 
 22. See Bernard Suits, Tricky Triad: Games, Play, and Sport, 15 J. PHIL. SPORT 1, 6 (1988) 
(“In performances, ideals are the crux of the matter. Just these ideals generate just these skills. 
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of the criteria in figure skating, for example, is “[f]low and effortless 
glide,”23 which is not a self-executing rule in the sense that someone not 
familiar with figure skating would be able to apply it in the appropriate 
way, but rather a standard that can be understood and applied only by 
someone who has internalized the norms of the sport. 
The inherent imprecision of this structure means that no judge will 
judge in precisely the same way as any other. Each will have traveled a 
unique path of acculturation into the sport, and each will have developed 
a perspective shaped by that acculturation and its interaction with her 
unique personality. Judges will thus vary in terms of how they go about 
the process of observing competitors, what they look for, and how they 
prioritize what they see.24 The result is that each judge will, to some 
greater or lesser degree, vary from the next in terms of her conception of 
ideas like “flow and effortless glide,” of the nature of the ideal 
performance more generally, and of how well any given competitor 
measures up to them. 
Significantly, none of this is to suggest that all bets are off and that 
judging in aesthetic sports is of the unmoored, “subjective” nature by 
which it is often characterized. The knowledge or sense upon which a 
judge draws did not spontaneously generate, but rather accreted over a 
long process of acculturation in the sport as the judge internalized the 
often unspoken understandings of how the sport is best undertaken. And 
the selection procedures for becoming a judge in aesthetic sports, which 
typically require prospective judges to undertake a process of apprentice 
judging in which they demonstrate that their assessments are sufficiently 
similar to those of established judges, provide a mechanism for ensuring 
 
That is why it is possible to speak of a perfect performance, at least in principle, without fear of 
contradiction . . . .”). 
 23. The concept is further explained as follows: “Rhythm, strength, clean strokes, and an 
efficient use of lean create a steady run to the blade and an ease of transfer of weight resulting in 
seemingly effortless power and acceleration.” U.S. Figure Skating Ass’n, Components with 
Explanations, https://www.usfigureskating.org/content/JS08A-Programcompexplan.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/DR34-2JL9] (stating the various factors in figure-skating judging).  
 24. See, e.g., Clare MacMahon & Bill Mildenhall, A Practical Perspective on Decision 
Making Influences in Sports Officiating, 7 INT’L J. SPORTS SCI. & COACHING 153, 160 (2012) 
(discussing officials’ use of heuristics).  
Ideally, all stimuli that are relevant for judging a performance are processed.  
However, because the human capacity to process information is limited, a judge 
needs to select which stimuli should undergo further processing.  At best, judges 
know how to allocate their attention.  For instance, expert judges in gymnastics 
have been shown to differ from novices in their visual search strategies.  By and 
large, this research shows that expert judges in sports develop effective 
anticipatory strategies that help to improve their decision making. 
Henning Plessner & Thomas Haar, Sports Performance Judgments from a Social Cognitive 
Perspective, 7 PSYCHOL. SPORT & EXERCISE 555, 560 (2006) (citations omitted). 
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broad consistency in the standards that are applied.25 In other words, a 
prospective judge must demonstrate that she has sufficiently internalized 
the understandings and expectations of the sport and its participants. 
Of course, this lack of specificity and of an ability to resort to some 
external touchstone for purposes of detecting and correcting errors opens 
judging in aesthetic sports to charges that decisions are the product of 
improper criteria. The very nature of the system is such that judges cannot 
point to some external measuring stick by which observers can verify that 
their decisions were the “correct” ones.26 The effect is exacerbated by the 
seeming inconsistencies resulting from the fact that each judge will hold 
a conception of the ideal that differs in some respects from that of her 
colleagues.27 To a considerable degree, these sports ask participants and 
observers to take the legitimacy of judges’ scoring on faith while at the 
same time making it easy to question that faith.  
Let us take a step back to view the process from a slightly different 
angle. We can regard judges’ decisions as being based in three broad 
categories of factors. The first category of factors (category-one factors) 
is a set of universally, or near-universally, accepted ideas about what 
constitutes excellence in the sport. Many of these are so basic as to be 
assumed obvious, such as the notion that, all else being equal, a figure-
skating routine performed without a fall will be superior to one with a 
fall, or a jump with four rotations is superior to one with three. But 
certainly there are other areas of broad agreement concerning less-
specifiable but nonetheless real aspects of posture or form as well as 
things we might regard as core components of the etiquette of the sport—
certain things that one simply does or does not do and as to which 
transgressions are generally understood to be nonmeritorious behavior.28  
The second category (category-two factors) consists of factors arising 
out of differing “schools of thought” regarding the nature of an ideal 
performance.29  Differences of taste, as I have suggested above, are 
unavoidable. All the factors that combine to give us each personalities 
that are unique, but which nonetheless bear categorizable similarities to 
others, likewise do their work in this more limited space.30 It should come 
as no surprise, for example, that a sport community in one country will 
have somewhat different visions of what constitutes the ideal than in 
 
 25. Oldfather, supra note 2, at 1035–36. 
 26. Id. at 1059. 
 27. See id. at 1028–29. 
 28. See id. at 1026. 
 29. See id. at 1029. 
 30. “Some judges like a particular style of music or skating over another. Cultural 
differences often come into play. Eastern European judges often prefer classical 
performances . . . . Western judges tend to be more receptive to rock or movie music . . . . ” Jere 
Longman, Olympics: The Scorekeepers; Scrutiny Has Judges Feeling Unsettled, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
15, 2002, at D1. 
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another.31 Nor should it come as a surprise that judges might exhibit what 
looks like “nationalistic bias”—that is, that judges conditioned to 
recognize and reward the particular version of excellences valued in their 
country will replicate that at the international level (and that their scores 
will therefore appear to favor their own competitors).32 These sorts of 
differences will also manifest themselves on a smaller scale, both in terms 
of variances in regional preferences as well as differing sets of 
preferences or “schools of thought” that emerge around preferences for 
particular positions or ways of moving.33 They might reflect intractable 
differences of emphasis that will never resolve into consensus, or they 
might be manifestations of an evolution or unsettling of some component 
of the performative ideal that will eventually resolve into a broadly shared 
understanding. Either way, their existence is inevitable and largely 
untroubling.  
Notably, judges drawing on criteria from either of these categories 
will not be acting subjectively in any strong sense of the word. That is, 
they will not be basing their decisions on unconstrained personal 
preference. They will instead be channeling a shared vision of excellence 
that they have internalized, and as a result, be applying a standard that is, 
in an important sense, external to them. So long as they apply this vision 
consistently and act in good faith to apply the performative ideal as they 
understand it, they are acting in accordance with their role. 
It is the third category (category-three factors) that provides the 
greatest cause for concern. Broadly speaking, it includes any reason for a 
judge’s decision that does not fall within the first two categories. More 
narrowly, we can identify certain sorts of factors that might influence a 
judge’s decisions but that are by all accounts improper. Thoroughly 
subjective judging, in the sense that it is intentionally based on some 
preference not among those viewed among the sports community as a 
legitimate component of the performative ideal, would certainly fall into 
this category. A judge who favored a competitor because of a relationship 
with that competitor, or because she was bribed, or because she happened 
 
 31.  One of the theories for the relative decline in the success of American figure skaters in 
international competition is that the American system was not sufficiently quick to react to 
changes in the international scoring system, such that American skaters rising through the ranks 
were rewarded for excellences that are not well-aligned with those valued at the international 
level. See Tara Lipinski, Opinion, It’s Time to Take Risks in the Rink Again, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 
2018, at A19. 
 32. See, e.g., Cheryl Litman & Thomas Stratmann, Judging on Thin Ice: The Effects of 
Group Membership on Evaluation, 70 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 763, 774 (2018); Eric Zitzewitz, 
Nationalism in Winter Sports Judging and Its Lessons for Organizational Decision Making, 15 J. 
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 67, 68–69 (2006). 
 33. Zitzewitz, supra note 32, at 68–69. 
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to find something about the competitor’s appearance particularly 
appealing, would be acting within this prohibited realm.  
There are also less pernicious ways in which a judge might be 
influenced by improper factors, and these, too, provide cause for concern. 
Research has revealed that a variety of factors can influence judges’ 
scoring, including a competitor’s reputation34 or team affiliation;35 
whether a given competitor appeared earlier or later within a sequence;36 
and whether the judge has access to the scores of other judges.37 These 
effects need not be, and likely are often not, intentional or even conscious 
influences. They nonetheless represent a skewing of scoring away from 
what a pure, good-faith application of the performative ideal calls for. 
Aesthetic sports use a variety of mechanisms that can be viewed as 
attempts to either encourage greater reliance on category-one factors or 
to decrease reliance on category-three factors. One approach is to change 
the rules of the sport to more precisely specify the criteria that judges 
must use, including by placing greater emphasis on those that are 
objectively verifiable—in effect, to make the practice of judging 
relatively more quantitative and less qualitative in nature.38 As an 
example, figure skating’s International Judging System (IJS), put in place 
following a judging scandal in the 2002 Winter Olympics, places greater 
weight on verifiable, technical elements of skating relative to its 
predecessor, which has in turn changed the nature of the skating that is 
rewarded under that system.39 
Other mechanisms exert a less direct influence. As noted already, the 
most basic of these is built into the processes by which one becomes a 
judge. Aesthetic sports almost universally require prospective judges to 
spend time in an apprenticeship of sorts, shadowing and scoring 
alongside accredited judges.40 Becoming a judge in the first instance 
requires that the candidate establish that her scores are sufficiently similar 
to those of accredited judges, thereby supporting the conclusion that she 
 
 34. Leanne C. Findlay & Diane M. Ste-Marie, A Reputation Bias in Figure Skating Judging, 
26 J. SPORT & EXERCISE PSYCHOL. 154, 161 (2004). 
 35. See id. at 164.  
 36. Iain Greenlees et al., Order Effects in Sport: Examining the Impact of Order of 
Information Presentation on Attributions of Ability, 8 PSYCHOL. SPORT & EXPERTISE 477, 485 
(2007). 
 37. See, e.g., Filip Boen et al., Open Feedback in Gymnastic Judging Causes Conformity 
Bias Based on Informational Influencing, 26 J. SPORTS SCI. 621, 626 (2008); Filip Boen et al., The 
Impact of Open Feedback on Conformity Among Judges in Rope Skipping, 7 PSYCHOL. SPORT & 
EXERCISE 577, 578 (2006) (describing research supporting the existence of six distinct biases, 
including a “conformity effect”). 
 38. See Graham McFee, Officiating in Aesthetic Sports, 40 J. PHIL. SPORT 1, 6–7 (2013). 
 39. Id. at 8–9, 11–12. 
 40. See, e.g., School of Judging, USA GYMNASTICS, https://usagym.org/pages/education/ 
pages/judging/ [https://perma.cc/HJ3C-BFXV]; So You Want to Be a Figure Skating Judge?, U.S. 
FIGURE SKATING, http://usfigureskating.org/story?id=89433 [https://perma.cc/U25C-6SK8]. 
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has internalized the norms of the sport to an adequate degree.41 Moving 
up through the ranks of judges involves replicating this basic process at 
each succeeding level.42 All of this, of course, is necessarily preceded by 
a period in which the prospective judge must internalize the norms of the 
sport and thereby formulate a concept of an ideal performance that is 
sufficiently like that of the existing set of judges.43  
Sports use other mechanisms, as well, to attempt to channel judges’ 
behavior in appropriate directions. To various degrees and in various 
combinations, aesthetic sports prescribe the locations from which judges 
view competitors,44 the extent to which communication is allowed 
between judges scoring the same event and between judges and 
competitors,45 and whether and to what extent judges provide an 
explanation of their scoring.46 Sports also routinely police for conflicts of 
interest, either by prohibiting judges from concurrently serving as 
coaches for any competitors in any context or by putting in place more 
limited restrictions aimed to prevent judges from scoring competitors 
with whom they have recently had a coaching or other relationship, and 
by otherwise attempting to minimize conflicts of interest that might be 
perceived as influencing judges’ behavior.47 At least in some instances, 
such as the Olympics, widespread attention and media interest provide a 
further source of discipline.48 
Of course, even taken as a whole these processes combine to provide 
only partial constraint. The combination of substantially ineffable and 
therefore indeterminate standards, together with reliance on mechanisms 
that only indirectly and imprecisely channel judges’ behavior, results in 
a world in which it is unrealistic to expect complete correspondence 
between existing judges or between existing and prospective judges. This 
leaves judging open to the critiques alluded to above.  But there is another 
consequence, which is to allow for shifts in the content of the 
performative ideal. To the extent that incoming judges hold conceptions 
of the ideal that differ in consistent ways from the views of existing 
judges, the content of the ideal will shift with the changing pool of judges. 
The change will necessarily be gradual and will be inherently resistant to 
dramatic shifts of the sort that would have been necessary, for example, 
 
 41. See Oldfather, supra note 2, at 1035–36. 
 42. See id. at 1036. 
 43. See So You Want to Be a Figure Skating Judge?, supra note 40. 
 44. Oldfather, supra note 2, at 1062–64. 
 45. Id. at 1058. 
 46. Id. at 1057–58. 
 47. Id. at 1054–55. 
 48. Litman & Stratmann, supra note 32, at 766. 
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to accommodate a skater such as Surya Bonaly.49 And at least in its 
particulars, that evolution might be regarded as good or bad from a 
normative perspective. Its existence, however, seems inevitable, and in a 
general sense necessary for the continued legitimacy of the process for 
the simple reason that the continued viability of the sport requires 
participants to buy into the idea that judges’ decisions reflect the 
conceptions of excellence held generally in the sport. 
B.  Aesthetic Judging as a Metaphor for Judging in Law 
All of this, or so it seems, looks quite similar to the situation 
confronted by judges in the legal system, especially in constitutional 
cases. To be sure, a considerable portion of judges’ work is governed by 
concepts that are articulable and that have indeed been articulated in rules 
that provide a clear resolution to a case or some of the issues presented 
within a case.50 This is true even in the Supreme Court, in which a 
substantial portion of decisions are unanimous.51 In this respect the 
operation of the legal system resembles a purposive sport, and the 
familiar judge-as-umpire metaphor is, at the very least, not inapt.  
But the easy cases do not represent the portion of the judiciary’s work 
that provokes concern. As one moves from clear text to ambiguity, or 
from a situation clearly governed by past decisions to cases of first 
impression, or from situations where all available authority appears to 
support one result to those in which the authorities conflict, judges must 
draw upon a widening array of methodological tools.52 Considerations 
such as “fit” take on an increasingly large role, and a conclusion that one 
approach or another better “fits” a given situation is often simply the 
assertion that, for reasons that are beyond the capacity of the judge to 
fully articulate, that approach best comports with her intuitive sense of 
 
 49. See Tik Root, Twenty Years Later, Figure Skating’s Most Famous Back Flip Remains 
Amazing (and Illegal), WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/sports/wp/2018/02/22/twenty-years-later-figure-skatings-most-famous-backflip-remains-
amazing-and-illegal/ [https://perma.cc/8J3U-JRK6]. 
 50. There seems to be general agreement on the proposition that most cases are easy, though 
estimates vary as to the precise proportion. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the 
New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 
286–87 (1997). 
 51. Since the 1940s, the Court has consistently decided roughly forty percent of its cases 
unanimously. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 249 tbl.3-1 (6th ed. 2015). 
 52. It would be more accurate to say that here is where they consciously draw upon such 
tools, as contrasted with the easier cases, in which the same forces are at work but are less likely 
to be consciously deployed. See Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1328 (1984) 
(“[R]ules, in law or anywhere else, do not stand in an independent relationship to a field of action 
on which they can simply be imposed; rather, rules have a circular or mutually interdependent 
relationship to the field of action in that they make sense only in reference to the very regularities 
they are thought to bring about.”). 
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the significant features of a situation and how the law applies to them. 
Karl Llewellyn’s notion of “situation sense,” first invoked above, is the 
most prominent articulation of this idea in the legal world. This 
knowledge, too, is the product of immersion in the craft of law, of having 
refined one’s sense of pattern recognition and thus internalized a sense 
of, if not the appropriate resolution to any given situation, at least the 
appropriate sorts of considerations to be taken into account in resolving 
it.53 The net result bears a strong resemblance to the situation in aesthetic 
sports. There exists, as an analogue to the performative ideal, a 
conception of law that represents the distillation of all pertinent legal 
concepts bearing on the situation before the judge.54 It, too, is diffuse and 
often indeterminate. It is not the “brooding omnipresence” that Justice 
Holmes derided,55 but rather “the felt reconciliation of concrete 
instances” that he praised as necessary to give content to a general 
principle.56 
Of course, no real judge has access to this ideal conception of law, and 
individual judges vary in their ability and inclination to approximate it, 
as well as in their views of how the ideal ought to be conceived. Here, 
too, one can imagine the judge’s thought processes being influenced by 
three categories of factors, which are analogous to those identified above 
for judges in aesthetic sports. The first category includes generally 
accepted ideas about what counts as appropriate legal authority and how 
 
 53. Dan M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense?” An Experimental Investigation 
of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 356, 360–62 (2016); 
see also Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, 
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (2011) 
(“Judges and lawyers subscribe to an elaborate network of craft norms. Acquired through 
professional training and experience, these norms generate a high degree of convergence among 
judges and lawyers on what counts as appropriate decisionmaking.”). 
 54. In the constitutional context, I take my suggestion to be at least broadly consistent with 
Mitchell Berman’s concept of “principled positivism.” See Mitchell N. Berman, Our Principled 
Constitution, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1325, 1331 (2018). Berman summarizes the idea as follows: 
Constitutional rules are determined by the interactions of our constitutional 
principles. In turn, constitutional principles are grounded in social and 
psychological facts—facts about what persons who make up the legal 
community say and do and believe. Principles exist in virtue of being “taken up” 
in certain ways by certain people. I will call this view “principled positivism”: 
legal rules are constituted by the interaction of legal principles, and legal 
principles are grounded in social facts that make up a complex social practice. 
Id. 
 55. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 56. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Use of Law Schools, in SPEECHES 28, 35 (1913). 
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judges are to use that authority in their reasoning process.57 It is generally 
understood that statutory and constitutional text matter and should play a 
prominent role in analysis to the extent they are sufficiently determinate 
to do so.58 Past case law likewise provides a point of departure for 
reasoning in any current case. There are more diffuse ideas in this 
category as well, such as that the doing of law entails reasoning forward 
from premises rather than backward from conclusions, that “[r]easoned 
elaboration” is a hallmark of legal reasoning, and a host of other ideas 
associated with rule-of-law values, all of which typically remain in the 
shadows, unstated but understood.59 This first category likely includes a 
broad swath of matters as to which there is greater reflective equilibrium 
than meets the eye. Our natural tendency to focus on difficult cases, both 
in law school and legal scholarship, may lead to a discounting of the 
degree of constraint provided by category-one factors.60  
The second category of considerations, involving different “schools 
of thought,” is large and the familiar topic of debate. Judges might 
generally agree that the text of a statute or constitution provides the 
beginning point of analysis, but there are differing views as to whether it 
should provide the end point as well, what it might mean for it to provide 
the end point, and how to make sense of the words that comprise a text.61 
 
 57. As Fish points out, it is tempting to overlook the fact that these factors, too, are rooted 
in shared assumptions and understandings: 
There is a temptation . . . to assume that . . . cases of perfect agreement are 
normative and that interpretation and its troubles enter in only in special 
circumstances. But agreement is not a function of particularly clear and 
perspicuous rules; it is a function of the fact that interpretive assumptions and 
procedures are so widely shared in a community that the rule appears to all in the 
same (interpreted) shape.  
Fish, supra note 52, at 1327. 
 58. Notably, this represents the sort of fluidity among the categories identified below. Many 
commentators regard the primacy of text as something that has moved into this first category only 
over the past thirty or forty years, and many further regard this as largely attributable to the efforts 
of Justice Scalia. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of 
Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1296 
(1990) (“Before Justice Scalia’s appointment . . . the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation 
could be described as eclectic, devoid of any unifying theory.”). 
 59. Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 73 NEV. L.J. 515, 547 (2016); see 
Adam Rigoni, Common-Law Judicial Reasoning and Analogy, 20 LEGAL THEORY 133, 148 
(2014). 
 60. The suggestion here is similar to the claim that research flowing out of the attitudinal 
model of judicial behavior overstates the influence of political factors by considering only those 
cases that are litigated. See, e.g., Kahan et al., supra note 53, at 358. 
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Is a search for the original understanding of the Constitution the only 
legitimate means of approaching it, or does that misconceive the 
appropriate nature of the enterprise? What is the proper way to approach 
stare decisis? Does empathy have a role to play in the judicial process? 
Does “judicial activism” entail a failure to adhere to the original 
understanding of the Constitution or a failure to be appropriately 
deferential to the political branches? These are but a few of the many 
issues as to which there are distinct positions, held in good faith, that are 
the product of each judge’s balancing and prioritization of the many 
considerations at work. 
As with judging in aesthetic sports, the third category includes any 
basis for reaching a decision that does not involve good-faith application 
of considerations from the first two categories. The spirit of the 
distinction, if not its precise content, was captured well by Justice David 
Souter in his response to an item on a questionnaire from the Senate 
Judiciary Committee in connection with his nomination to the First 
Circuit.62 In providing his views on judicial activism, Justice Souter noted 
“the distinction between personal and judicially cognizable values.”63 
The most obvious examples of the former include the sort drawn on in 
what could be characterized as purely political or otherwise “result-
oriented” judging. Law, properly applied, will often require a judge to 
reach a result in a specific case or with respect to a particular issue that is 
different from the result she would reach if she were free to decide in an 
unconstrained fashion.64 Stated generally, any reason that leads a judge 
to fail to meet that criterion would fall into this category. Other examples 
beyond a simple preference for a specific result include a desire to favor 
a specific litigant, a desire to please certain other audiences for a decision 
 
While nearly all theorists would agree that the text is the starting place for 
constitutional interpretation, and most even agree that text should be 
determinative if it clearly prescribes a certain result, there is a wide range of 
views on such questions as when the text is clear and what judges ought to do if 
it is not. 
 
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, & THOMAS D. ROWE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: 
ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 175 (3d ed. 2007). 
 62. See Linda Greenhouse, An ‘Intellectual Mind’: David Hackett Souter, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 24, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/24/us/man-in-the-news-an-intellectual-mind-
david-hackett-souter.html [https://perma.cc/554C-SBXN]. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See Jeffrey Malkan, Retrospective Justification, 6 TOURO L. REV. 213, 238 (1990). The 
distinction is perhaps most evident in the different decision-making processes of courts and 
legislatures. Judges are expected to provide a justification for their decisions, and that justification 
is a key component of the legitimacy of a judicial decision. See Bruce Fein & Burt Neuborne, The 
Case for Independence, 61 OR. ST. B. BULL. 9, 12 (2001). Legislative votes need not be explained, 
by reference to principle or otherwise. Id.  
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(such as an appointing authority or a judge’s social peers), or having an 
economic stake in the outcome. 
Here, too, the operation of factors in this third category need not be 
intentionally or even consciously invoked to provide cause for concern. 
The evidence suggests that judges fall prey to at least many of the same 
systematic cognitive errors as people more broadly,65 which can drive 
their decision-making away from that which might flow from a truly 
dispassionate analysis. And at least some of the observed correlation 
between judges’ ideology and their decision-making is likely a product 
not of ideology’s influence on good-faith differences concerning the 
nature of the judicial role, but rather its clouding of thought. As Justice 
Robert H. Jackson observed in his Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer66 opinion,  
The opinions of judges, no less than executives and 
publicists, often suffer the infirmity of confusing the issue of 
a power’s validity with the cause it is invoked to 
promote . . . . The tendency is strong to emphasize transient 
results upon policies . . . and lose sight of enduring 
consequences . . . .67 
The legal system employs a variety of mechanisms to channel judicial 
decision-making toward factors falling into the first two categories. The 
norm is for judicial decisions to be accompanied by a written or at least 
oral justification in which the judge or panel of judges offers 
appropriately legal reasons.68 Appellate courts, which are the sole source 
of precedential authority, and as to which there is thus greater need to 
ensure that decisions reflect a closer approximation of the ideal 
conception of law, engage in panel decision-making.69 This is, in effect, 
a mechanism for producing decisions that are more likely to approximate 
that ideal.70 Various ethical rules require judges to recuse themselves in 
situations presenting conflicts of interest or otherwise involving factors 
 
 65. For an overview, see generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging the 
Judiciary by the Numbers: Empirical Research on Judges, 13 ANN. REV. L & SOC. SCI. 203, 211 
(2017). 
 66. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 67. Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 68. For an exploration of the norms and standards governing the issuance of judicial 
opinions, see Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1283, 1288–97 (2008). 
 69. Arthur D. Hellman, Precedent, Predictability, and Federal Appellate Structure, 60 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 1029, 1037, 1044 (1999). 
 70. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 
82, 97–98 (1986). 
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that might cause an observer to call their impartiality into question.71 The 
adversarial process itself is designed to provide judges with opposing 
perspectives advanced by parties with the incentive to offer the best 
version of their case.72 
Acculturation and selection processes play a role as well, though their 
operation differs considerably from the arrangements in aesthetic sports. 
Judges’ introduction to the profession occurs in law school, where, with 
some variation from one law school to the next, everyone studies the 
same core set of topics.73 The remainder of law school provides 
considerable curricular flexibility, which, together with the influence of 
differing pedagogical tendencies and would-be judges’ interaction with 
differing student cultures among law schools, limits the uniformity of this 
initial period of professional acculturation.74 Things become even more 
diffuse as lawyers begin and progress through their practice careers, 
which tend toward specialization. Those lawyers who are litigators must 
of course pitch their arguments to existing judges, and do so by reference 
to past cases and other pertinent authority, and in that sense must continue 
to absorb the system’s norms and understandings. But the content of the 
ideal itself, as conveyed through its most visible manifestations, will 
typically be less salient than in aesthetic sports, which often feature 
examples of excellence on the Olympic stage every four years. This will 
be so whether that ideal is imagined to exist in some global, Dworkinian 
sense or instead limited to more discrete subject areas. 
Judicial selection practices in law are likewise less well equipped to 
foster deep uniformity. The selection process for federal judges involves 
political actors in the form of both the President and the Senate, and 
especially in eras of political polarization seems likely to result in the 
selection of judges whose preferences with respect to the sorts of factors 
in category two will differ considerably depending on which party 
controls the selection process. These differences can be exacerbated by 
associated changes in the nature and scope of the generally accepted 
factors in category one because, as will be developed below, the 
boundaries between the categories are not fixed, and once-contested ideas 
can become bedrock principles and vice versa. These changes, of course, 
are connected to, if not products of, changes in the larger social and 
political context in which the judiciary operates.  
 
 71. “There is perhaps no more basic precept pertaining to the judiciary than the one holding 
that judges should be sufficiently detached and free from predisposition in their decision-making.” 
JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 4.01, at 4-2 (4th ed. 2007). 
 72. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 273–305 (2004) 
(addressing the significance of party participation). 
 73. See Shawn P. O’Connor, What to Expect as a First Year Law Student, U.S. NEWS 
(May 21, 2012), https://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/law-admissions-lowdown/2012/05/21/ 
what-to-expect-as-a-first-year-law-student [https://perma.cc/7PBS-ZYGU]. 
 74. Id. 
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II.  AESTHETIC JUDGING AND THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 
A.  The Unwritten Constitution  
Viewed as a practice, constitutional law in particular bears a strong 
similarity to aesthetic sports insofar as it is replete with incompletely 
articulated concepts and understandings. Indeed, the idea that 
implementation of the Constitution by its very nature requires resort to 
extra-constitutional considerations is a familiar one. The document 
cannot legitimate itself,75 provides no guidance as to how it is to be 
interpreted,76 and requires the development of “decision rules” by which 
its provisions can be applied to specific controversies.77 All of this, in 
turn, entails resort to larger ideas including those about the nature of the 
government created by the Constitution and the role of the judiciary 
within that government. There is much to constitutional law that is, in 
effect, unwritten78—even if one believes that the meaning of the 
Constitution was fixed at the time of ratification.79 
 
 75. Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 145, 145 (Sanford 
Levinson ed., 1995). 
 76. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent and the Necessary Externality of Constitutional 
Norms, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 45–46 (1994) (“[T]hat neither the constitutional text, nor 
any other internal conception of what the Constitution is, can provide, without fatal circularity, 
any guidance in determining what constitutes the Constitution.”). But not everyone accepts this 
proposition. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own 
Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 858, 861–62 (2009). 
 77. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 113 (2004) 
(“[T]he competing demands of stability and flexibility might find more effective reconciliation in 
the development of stare decisis practices that allow decision rules to be modified or abandoned 
somewhat more readily than operative propositions.”). 
 78. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS 
AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY, at xi (2012) (“The written Constitution cannot work as intended 
without something outside of it—America’s unwritten Constitution—to fill in its gaps and to 
stabilize it.”). 
 79. One who believes that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed, and that therefore the 
only appropriate method for implementing it as law involves some sort of originalism, must still 
select from among the many varieties of originalism, choose the level of generality at which to 
apply the concepts embodied in the fixed Constitution, and otherwise make decisions about 
application that are necessarily driven by arguments and considerations external to the document. 
See Kahan, supra note 8, at 17. One of the weaknesses in the originalist position is that it too 
casually equates the Constitution with ordinary law, thereby assuming that the Constitution should 
be treated in the same way a statute should be treated. But while there is a clear rule of recognition 
for statutes—more or less that they were enacted in accordance with the Constitution—there is 
not similarly a clear rule of recognition for the Constitution, and indeed at the time of ratification 
the notion that a constitution should be treated analogously to a statute was largely unknown. See 
JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE 
FOUNDING ERA 7 (2018) (noting that at its inception, the Constitution was not understood as a 
fundamentally written text or as “a conventional species of law—defined by its legal content and 
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The components of this unwritten constitution range from the concrete 
to the abstract. The most concrete manifestations appear in the context of 
the application of doctrinal tests to specific factual situations. The 
concepts lying behind some of the Constitution’s open-textured 
provisions—things like equal protection, cruel and unusual punishment, 
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and so on—
cannot be completely articulated. Giving meaning to such general 
propositions requires, in Llewellyn’s memorable phrasing, “the heaping 
up of concrete instances.”80 A court in applying the concepts to a specific 
situation relies as much on this accumulated, not-fully articulable 
“situation sense” in reaching its decisions as it does on the traditional 
tools of legal analysis. Justice Stewart’s “I know it when I see it” 
standard, derided though it may be, embodies an important truth about 
the nature of judging in constitutional cases and otherwise.81  
Slightly more general in nature are what Professor Mitchell Berman 
calls decision rules.82 The underlying insight is that there is a distinction 
between determining the meaning of a constitutional provision and 
determining whether that provision is satisfied in a specific situation, the 
latter of which entails the development of a doctrinal framework for the 
provision’s implementation.83 There is, for example, the meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause and also the tiered scrutiny framework that the 
Court has developed for its implementation.84 To discern the clause’s 
meaning, such as by concluding that the clause contemplates some 
version of formal or substantive equality, does not do all the work 
required to determine whether its requirements are satisfied in a given 
instance. Decision rules, or even what we might consider a nonbinding 
decision standard such as the United States v. Carolene Products Co.85 
 
underlying legal purpose, susceptible to orthodox legal reasoning, interpretation, and 
adjudication, and thus the province of legal professionals to decode”). This is not to deny the 
possibility that whatever it is that provides contemporary legitimacy to the Constitution could also 
entail regarding originalism as the only legitimate means of interpreting the document, but rather 
to suggest that such an approach is not inevitable, nor does it appear to be an accurate description 
of the Constitution or constitutional practice as currently legitimated. 
 80. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY 12 
(1930). Justice Holmes set forth a similar idea several decades before, observing that  
to make a general principle worth anything you must give it a body; you must 
show in what way and how far it would be applied actually in an actual system; 
you must show how it has gradually emerged as the felt reconciliation of concrete 
instances no one of which established it in terms.  
Holmes, supra note 56, at 34–35. 
 81. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 82. See Berman, supra note 77. 
 83. Id. at 9. 
 84. See id. at 32–33. 
 85. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
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Footnote Four framework,86 can easily be regarded as part of the 
unwritten constitution. 
Finally, there are the more abstract principles and ideas that guide the 
formulation of the more specific doctrinal components. There is the basic 
question of what counts as a valid argument,87 and it is fashionable for 
participants in constitutional debates to speak in terms of “arguments 
moving from off the wall to on the wall”88 as the terms of the broader 
political and sociological contexts from which these arguments arise 
shift. This happens not in accordance with some clearly defined rule of 
recognition, but rather via subtle change introduced through the various 
mechanisms of acculturation that produce a substantial part of a judge’s 
outlook. Shifts in these broader, less tangible aspects of the unwritten 
constitution in turn affect the content of its less abstract components (such 
as decision rules) as well as the accepted understanding of the written 
portions of the Constitution. This set of ideas includes as well the 
judiciary’s conception of its own role within the system of government, 
including its view of its proper role relative to the political branches and 
its sense of its own institutional capital. Such considerations manifest 
themselves at a retail level in the contours of the various justiciability 
doctrines and the Court’s exercise of the passive virtues89 as well as at a 
more wholesale level through the terms of the Court’s engagement with 
the other branches. Marbury v. Madison90 was the work of a Court that 
 
 86. See id. at 152 n.4. 
 87. See Schauer, supra note 10, at 1960. 
 88. Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went 
Mainstream, ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/ 
from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/ [https: 
//perma.cc/Q4SL-T8E6] (“Off-the-wall arguments are those most well-trained lawyers think are 
clearly wrong; on-the-wall arguments, by contrast, are arguments that are at least plausible, and 
therefore may become law, especially if brought before judges likely to be sympathetic to them. 
The history of American constitutional development, in large part, has been the history of 
formerly crazy arguments moving from off the wall to on the wall, and then being adopted by 
courts.”). 
 89. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 111 (1962).  
In a narrow sense, the passive virtues are techniques of adjudication (or rather, 
of non-adjudication). More broadly understood, they are the forms of practical 
wisdom, the modalities of prudence, whose mastery and proper exercise are 
essential to the external aspect of the Court’s work—its effort to ameliorate the 
Lincolnian tension by fashioning a continually improving accommodation 
between the claims of principle on the one hand, and the resistant pressures of 
existing beliefs and institutions on the other.  
Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1584 
(1985). 
 90. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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viewed itself as having a substantial role in checking the political 
branches but that was unsure of its institutional capital. Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission91 was the work of a Court with high 
regard for its own power in both senses. 
At any moment the sum of all of these unwritten, and to some extent 
ultimately inarticulable, factors produces in any given Justice—and 
through a process of simple arithmetic in the Court itself—if not a strong 
sense that there is a specific “right” answer to a given constitutional 
question, at least a sense that the range of possible acceptable answers is 
constrained. To be sure, that range may be broad, occasionally to such an 
extent as to appear to provide little real constraint. But the forces remain, 
even (and perhaps especially) in cases where the traditional material of 
legal reasoning cannot do all the work.  
B.  Aesthetic Judging and Constitutional Change 
These unwritten constitutional concepts can potentially fall into any 
of the three categories of grounds for decision outlined above. Generally 
accepted, category-one factors include basic suppositions about the 
nature of the Constitution (such as that the text matters in more than an 
aspirational sense) as well as understandings of notions like separation of 
powers, the democratic process, and the nature of adjudication. Concepts 
with a more evident textual hook fall into this category as well. For 
example, Matthews v. Eldridge92 states an accepted notion of the core of 
what procedural due process requires and provides a framework for 
application of that core to specific situations.93 It is necessarily imprecise 
in doing so, however, simply because it is impossible even to identify in 
advance all the various settings in which the concepts must be applied, 
much less prescribe the process required in each of them. Ultimately, 
then, “due process” serves to invoke an idea that is akin to “flow and 
effortless glide,” and its proper application requires immersion in the 
practice, in both senses, of law and the accompanying exposure to the 
factors that play into the determination of how much process is due in any 
given situation or situation-type. The scope and prevalence of factors 
falling into this first category are often overlooked, but the evidence 
suggests that their effect is considerably greater than meets the eye.94 
Roughly 40% of the Supreme Court’s decisions in recent decades have 
been unanimous.95 Of course, considering only the cases the Court elects 
 
 91. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 92. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 93. Id. at 335, 348. 
 94. FALLON, supra note 10, at 120–23. 
 95. See EPSTEIN ET AL.,  supra note 51. 
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to review certainly understates the extent to which the Justices agree.96 
Further, it seems reasonable to believe that much of that agreement relates 
to unwritten aspects of the constitutional order. 
The second category includes the sorts of issues and questions that get 
most of the attention in constitutional law classrooms and scholarship. 
The participants in familiar debates over originalism and its 
alternatives,97 the proper approaches to formulating and implementing 
ideas about federalism and separation of powers,98 how to identify and 
develop unenumerated rights,99 and the like bring with them good-faith 
differences in perspective, which function in ways that are parallel to 
differing schools of thought about the components and nature of an ideal 
figure-skating performance. These differing perspectives can, at least in 
general, be regarded as flowing from differences on more abstract matters 
about the nature and function of the Constitution, perhaps especially with 
respect to the appropriate nature and scope of the judicial role. Without 
question many of these differences are correlated with ideology, though 
the causation may lie elsewhere.100 In addition, some of what drives 
preferences in this category may be the product of unstated assumptions 
about how worried we ought to be about factors in the third category 
influencing the Justices’ behavior. One version of the argument for 
originalism, after all, is the claim that any approach that does not tether 
the Justices to a search for original public meaning leaves them free to 
insert their own, nonlegal preferences into their decision-making.101 It is, 
in other words, an argument for a specific category-two approach based 
in concerns about the relative inability of other approaches to prevent 
resort to category-three factors.102 
 
 96. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, What Are the Judiciary’s Politics?, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 
455, 467–68 (2018) (suggesting that the Supreme Court will not be inclined to grant certiorari 
presenting issues as to which there is consensus among ideologically diverse courts of appeals). 
 97. See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS 
AND PERSPECTIVES (4th ed. 2013) (surveying the judicial, political, and academic debates within 
the field of American constitutional theory). 
 98. See, e.g., JOHN H. GARVEY ET AL., MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER, at iii 
(5th ed. 2004). 
 99. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), in which Justices Scalia and Brennan 
debated the level of generality at which to consult history in determining whether an asserted 
liberty interest is one that has been traditionally protected such that it can be deemed 
“fundamental.” See id. at 127 n.6 (opinion of Scalia, J.); id. at 140–41 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 100. See Kahan et al., supra note 53, at 356–57. 
 101. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 
(1989). 
 102. Justice Scalia can be regarded as having made another such point in his essay 
advocating in favor of rule-based lawmaking by the Supreme Court:  
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Indeed, concerns about the influence of category-three factors are 
prevalent in debates about the functioning of the Supreme Court and of 
constitutional law more generally. The Court is often characterized as a 
political court,103 the Justices are commonly described as being either 
“liberal” or “conservative,”104 and many regard at least some of its higher 
profile decisions as the product of an only thinly veiled result 
orientation.105 At the same time, the Justices themselves routinely employ 
rhetoric in their opinions that is consistent with the conclusion that they 
regard their colleagues as falling prey to the influence of such improper 
considerations.106 Those influences, to the extent they exist, are certainly 
the product of unwritten factors, though, due to their acknowledged 
illegitimacy, not the unwritten Constitution. 
Taking all of this as a whole provides a way of thinking about how the 
Court goes about its work. Ideally, in deciding cases, the Justices will 
draw upon factors in categories one and two in varying combinations 
depending on the case. Often the application of these factors will be clear, 
resulting in a unanimous or near-unanimous decision.107 Often the factors 
will conflict. Sometimes, undoubtedly, the Justices will be making law, 
in the sense that none of the text of the Constitution, past case law, or 
settled norms provides any sort of constrained framework for analysis.108 
 
[W]e should recognize that, at the point where an appellate judge says that the 
remaining issue must be decided on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, 
or by a balancing of all the factors involved, he begins to resemble a finder of 
fact more than a determiner of law. To reach such a stage is, in a way, a 
regrettable concession of defeat—an acknowledgement that we have passed the 
point where “law,” properly speaking, has any further application.  
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1182 (1989). 
 103. Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 39 (2005). 
 104. Perhaps the strongest statement of the position comes from the architects of the 
attitudinal model of judicial behavior:  
This model holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of 
the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices. Simply put, 
Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall 
voted the way he did because he was extremely liberal. 
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
REVISITED 86 (2002). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Perhaps the most prominent recent example is Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in 
Obergefell v. Hodges: “The majority’s decision is an act of will, not legal judgment. The right it 
announces has no basis in the Constitution or this Court’s precedent.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 
S. Ct. 2584, 2611–12 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 107. See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55 (2004); PPL Mont., LLC v. 
Montana, 565 U.S. 576 (2012).  
 108. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611–12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
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But often they can be regarded as, in a real sense, “finding” it.109 This can 
be true in the sense that a case calls upon the Court to implement one of 
the open-textured provisions of the Constitution, involving a legal 
concept that can be stated only in generalities and can be fully appreciated 
only through its particular applications.110 The Court in such a situation 
is not so much engaged in a quest to make law as to discover, apply, and 
refine as necessary the underlying concept. It can be true in a broader 
sense as well. A Justice confronted with a question of the sort that is not 
frequently contested might nonetheless perceive herself as (and perhaps 
be) engaged in a similar process. She, too, might be drawing upon a set 
of concepts that she has internalized and that she regards as leading her 
to a correct answer.111 She will be acting in a manner akin to a judge in 
an aesthetic sport. And we might imagine that in many cases enough of 
her colleagues will find themselves guided by those same concepts in 
such a way and to such a degree that we can characterize the Court itself 
as acting in such a manner. 
Viewing the Supreme Court and the nature of its work through this 
lens provides a useful perspective on change in constitutional law. As 
with aesthetic sports, change can come from outside, here in the form of 
constitutional amendment. But change is likewise inevitable within the 
practice itself and via mechanisms that the aesthetic-judge metaphor 
highlights. The members of the Court change over time, and with changes 
in personnel comes change in the Court’s collective conception of the 
proper content and mechanisms of constitutional law.112 Consider for 
example the evolution in understanding of what the Equal Protection 
Clause requires. For the iteration of the Court that was responsible for 
interpreting and implementing the clause in its early years, the 
classification of people based on race and sex was largely unremarkable 
in ways and to an extent that are unthinkable today.113 But society’s 
understanding of equality changed over time, and the legal profession’s 
understanding of equality and of the sorts of factors that are pertinent to 
answering questions relating to equal treatment as a legal concept 
likewise changed as the composition of the Court was refreshed over 
 
 109. For a recent favorable treatment of the notion that it is entirely plausible to regard judges 
as “finding” law, see Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527 (2019). 
 110. See Holmes, supra note 56, at 34–35. 
 111. For a compelling discussion drawing primarily on Llewellyn’s work, see ANTHONY T. 
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 209–25 (1993). 
 112. FALLON, supra note 10, at 114–20. 
 113. Consider the apparent ease with which the Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson. See Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896) (“[T]he case reduces itself to the question whether the 
statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation . . . . [W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes 
or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable . . . .”), 
overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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time.114 Such changes occur on a smaller scale as well—such as the 
Rehnquist Court’s incremental adjustments in favor of federalism—via a 
mechanism that Professors Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson called 
“partisan entrenchment.”115 New Justices generally “reflect the vector 
sum of political forces at the time of their confirmation,” and as social 
and political tides shift so will the Court’s jurisprudence and, in turn, the 
established understandings of constitutional practice.116  Over time the 
contents of categories one and two, and perhaps even occasionally three, 
shift as ideas and understandings go in and out of fashion.117 As with 
aesthetic sports, these sorts of shifts are necessary to maintain the 
perceived legitimacy of the Court and its decisions because a Court that 
falls too far out of step with society or the political branches runs the risk 
of being marginalized or even ignored.118 
These shifts are aided and moderated by other, more procedural 
aspects of the unwritten constitution. The doctrine of stare decisis serves 
to provisionally fix our understanding of constitutional meaning in 
transitional areas.119 The doctrine comes into play only in situations 
where a later court believes that a past decision was likely wrong, but not 
 
 114. The Court that decided Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), manifests an entirely 
different attitude from that of the Plessy Court, noting that statutes making racial distinctions must 
meet a “very heavy burden of justification,” id. at 9, and concluding that Virginia’s miscegenation 
statutes were based in nothing but “invidious racial discrimination,” id. at 11.  
 115. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066 (2001). 
 116. See id. at 1067–71. 
 117. As Richard Fallon puts it: 
[L]aw, in the relevant sense, resides in norms of judicial practice that structure 
and constrain but do not always uniquely determine legal judgment. Such norms 
allow room for reasonable disagreement but mark some positions as legally 
untenable or unreasonable. What complicates matters is that even the norms that 
exclude some conclusions as legally unreasonable can themselves have vague, 
disputable fringes. In other words, we have, and need to understand the 
possibility of, debates about whether some judicial rulings are beyond the pale 
of the legally tenable. 
FALLON, supra note 10, at 7. 
 118. As Amnon Reichman has observed, law as a practice does not exist in isolation. See 
Amnon Reichman, The Dimensions of Law: Judicial Craft, Its Public Perception, and the Role of 
the Scholar, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1619, 1643, 1651–54 (2007). Rather, it affects and is affected by 
a host of adjacent practices, and at least sometimes the pull exerted by those practices will be 
sufficiently strong to lead the Court to depart from strict adherence to the norms of the legal 
profession. See id. at 1651–53, 1662–63. Given the interrelations among the various practices, it 
is unsurprising to see change over time, and changes in what counts as a legal argument can and 
will be influenced by forces located primarily outside of the legal system as we normally conceive 
of it. 
 119. Chad M. Oldfather, Methodological Pluralism and Constitutional Interpretation, 80 
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2014). 
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wrong enough to merit overturning.120 A past decision regarded as clearly 
correct does not need a thumb on the scale for a later court to adhere to 
it. Such a later court would have reached the same outcome even without 
the past decision and as such stare decisis will have done no work.121 It 
thus serves as something of a shuttling mechanism between the first two 
categories of reasons, providing a steadying influence as ideas and 
interpretations come into and out of fashion.122 We might similarly view 
aspects of the political question doctrine as part of a related judicial effort 
to police the proper bounds of decision.123 Efforts to apply the “lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards” and “initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion”124 prongs of 
the doctrine can be regarded as attempts to delineate the boundary 
between categories two and three.  
The final sense in which the metaphor of the aesthetic judge is useful 
is in serving as a cautionary tale. Judging, on this view, necessarily 
involves the invocation of a host of unstated or partially stated norms, 
practices, and understandings. Because and to the extent that these norms, 
practices, and understanding are generally shared among the community 
of judges, they serve as a critical source of constraint and regularity. 
Certain approaches and certain results will be instantly recognizable as 
inappropriate among those who share these understandings. But if they 
are not shared, the community of judges will not converge on the same 
set of answers. If the scope of disagreement is too large, and if the terms 
in which the practice is contested include the allegation that some subset 
of judges regularly draws on illegitimate, category-three factors, then the 
judicial system potentially faces its own version of a figure-skating-
judging scandal. As Illinois Solicitor General Carolyn Shapiro has 
forcefully argued, “there is a difference between considering judicial 
decisions wrong and considering them illegitimate.”125 Such professed 
 
 120. BRIAN H. BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 153 (5th ed. 2009) (“[P]recedent 
is only of crucial importance when the prior case was wrongly decided (or at least could have been 
decided in a different way with equal legitimacy).”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Oldfather, supra note 119, at 15–16, 18. 
 123. See J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
97, 101 (1998). 
 124. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 125. Carolyn Shapiro, Remarks at the Law Day Lunch Held by the McLean County (Ill.) Bar 
Association (May 2, 2018) (transcript on file with author).  
If we deny that judges and justices exercise discretion and judgment, if we claim 
that there are logically deducible and objectively correct answers to even the 
most difficult or controversial legal questions, if we believe, or pretend to 
believe, that a nominees’ past thoughts and statements and actions are simply 
irrelevant to their job as judge because all they are going to do is act as a legal 
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certitude about the rightness of one’s own conclusions and the wrongness 
of those who disagree, particularly when it appears in a judicial opinion, 
can deepen the degree of conflict not only within the Court, but also 
among the audience for its decisions.126 
The root problem in figure skating may have been as much a problem 
of perception as of the underlying judging.127 The relevant public came 
to perceive judging in skating as driven by factors other than those by 
which it should have been driven.128 Such a decay in perceived legitimacy 
need not involve judges relying on category-three factors. It might, 
instead, be the product of a perception that arises out of an apparent 
prevalence of category-two factors relative to category-one factors. If 
judging seems primarily to be a product of which school of thought one 
adheres to, then what follows is a breakdown of the performative ideal. 
There is not one ideal, subject to marginal disagreement as to some of its 
aspects. There are instead multiple ideals, subject to multiple allegiances. 
Such a loss of consensus in a sport can lead to a situation in which one of 
the rival schools of thought breaks off to form its own version of the sport. 
What the metaphor suggests, then, is the importance of the cultivation 
and nourishment of shared norms in the world of law. This is especially 
challenging in a world of great social change and deep division. But it 
can take place in a number of ways, including civic and legal education, 
individual judicial behavior,129 and structural design. The legitimacy of 
 
computer doing legal math—then what does that mean when judges and justices 
disagree, as in fact they often do? Logically, it must mean that some of them are 
not just wrong—but lawless.   
Id.; see also Carolyn Shapiro, The Language of Neutrality in Supreme Court Confirmation 
Hearings, 122 DICK. L. REV. 585, 601–02, 637 (2018) (explaining that judges must exercise 
discretion and judgment because, in many cases, “there is no clear ball or strike to call” and that 
emphasizing neutrality and objectivity “could harm the Court’s legitimacy”); Carolyn Shapiro, 
What Members of Congress Say About the Supreme Court and Why It Matters, 93 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 453, 458–59 (2018) (arguing that politically charged rhetoric undermines judicial legitimacy 
when the rhetoric not only disagrees with a court’s decision but also states that the court’s 
decision-making process was lawless or illegitimate). 
 126. See Kahan, supra note 8, at 60 (“Studies of motivated cognition and related dynamics 
show that pronouncements of certitude deepen group-based conflict.”). 
 127. See Eric Zitzewitz, Does Transparency Reduce Favoritism and Corruption? Evidence 
from the Reform of Figure Skating Judging, 15 J. SPORTS ECON. 3, 25 (2014) (explaining that 
changes in the judging of figure skating may have been “to reduce the perception of corruption 
rather than actual corruption”). 
 128. See Elena V. Stepanova et al., They Saw a Triple Lutz: Bias and Its Perception in 
American and Russian Newspaper Coverage of the 2002 Olympic Figure Skating Scandal, 39 J. 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1763, 1764 (2009) (mentioning the allegations of vote trading and a 
“perception of thievery” during the 2002 figure-skating scandal). 
 129. For example, Dan Kahan suggests that the Justices should alter their opinion-writing 
style to minimize the corrosive effects of motivated and identity-protective cognition. Kahan, 
supra note 8, at 28, 30. 
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the Constitution and the Court depends on the acceptance of, or at least 
acquiescence in, the legitimacy of the entire constitutional regime, 
including the judiciary’s role within it.130 It is, as the Civil War attests, 
not such an easy thing for a subset of the population to break off and form 
its own league if a portion of the population denies that legitimacy. 
CONCLUSION 
Among other things, viewing the role of judges in law by comparison 
to their counterparts in aesthetic sports highlights the critical role that 
socialization and acculturation play in the process of judging, as well as 
how the connection between acculturation and decision-making supports 
the perceived legitimacy of the entire enterprise. In an ideal world, or at 
least one version of an ideal world, there would be complete uniformity. 
Judges in aesthetic sports would share an understanding of the 
performative ideal, and there would be complete consistency in rankings 
from one judge to the next. Likewise, judges in the legal world would 
share an understanding of the content of law, in both its written and 
unwritten manifestations, as well as its application. Change would occur 
seamlessly. We do not live in that world. 
Both systems strive for an approximation of the ideal, while at the 
same time implicitly recognizing that differences exist and that change 
will occur and must be accommodated. Aesthetic sports, perhaps due to 
their narrower domain, are able to achieve this more completely, in large 
part by conditioning entry into the judicial ranks on a demonstration of 
sufficient conformity with existing, shared understandings. Law provides 
fewer such assurances. The acculturation process is more diffuse, and the 
selection mechanisms are too susceptible to influence by partisans. 
Extreme political polarization seems certain to undercut the scope of 
shared understandings, and the growing influence of ideologically 
inflected groups within law schools and the profession may serve both to 
perpetuate and underscore the notion that there are “teams” not only in 
the political sense, but also the legal one, with a corresponding increase 
in the scope of category-two bases of decision-making and decrease in 
category-one.131  
 
 130. FALLON, supra note 10, at 9 (“We accept the Court’s authority because we accept, and 
most of us feel obliged to support, the Constitution and the American legal system as a whole.”). 
As Tara Grove has argued, politically divisive moments like the present one can present two sorts 
of challenges to the Court’s legitimacy, one arising out of the conflict between its sociological 
and legal legitimacy and the other arising out of pressures arising out of dysfunction in the political 
branches. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 
2240, 2272 (2019) (reviewing FALLON, supra note 10). 
 131. In an important recent book, Neal Devins and Lawrence Baum persuasively argue “that 
the polarization of the parties has spilled over to Supreme Court appointments” and “that a less 
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In the midst of all this a metaphor may seem trivial. I would suggest 
the contrary—that a metaphor can function as a sort of meta-decision 
rule, an encapsulation of all the various factors that play a part in 
decision-making, a device for highlighting certain features of a situation 
and why they matter, and a useful shorthand in thinking about how we 
might assess the systems and processes of adjudication and constitutional 
change. It can also serve as a cautionary tale. Just as scandals in figure-
skating judging led to outside intervention in the form of rule changes, so 
too might a Court regarded as departing too far from shared norms invite 
external intervention, whether in the form of court-packing or otherwise. 
 
noticed phenomenon—the orientation of Supreme Court Justices toward elite networks whose 
approval is important to them—has also helped to create party-line divisions on the Court.” NEAL 
DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN DIVISIONS CAME TO THE 
SUPREME COURT, at xvi (2019). 
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